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National Identity As Political Ideology 
The events of 1990 and 1991 represent 
a historical turning point in the devel- 
opment of former Yugoslavia. That 
Yugoslavia, which consisted of six re- 
publics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
and Serbia), had been an example of a 
relatively developed multi-ethnic so- 
cialist state; but from that time its 
former republics began to separate 
into ethno-national states, and thus 
Serbia and Montenegro, sharing an 
identical national-political ideology, 
formed the "new" Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The League of Commu- 
nists of Yugoslavia, up to that point the 
largest ideological-political institution 
in the land, disappeared from the po- 
litical scene. Its functionaries divided 
off into their respective ethno-national 
republican parties, whose basic politi- 
cal motto could be expressed in two 
words-"national democracy." The 
ideological mechanisms (the political 
power of an elite, political monopoly, 
and political privilege) which became 
characteristic of all these parties, re- 
gardless of their changed names, were 
carried over from the "old" regime, 
because the political leaders of these 
new parties, as well as the vast major- 
ity of their membership, had previ- 
ously been "sociopolitical" workers 
--Communists. Nationalism as a tran- 
sition to nationalist democracy is a 
process which began at that point in 
Yugoslavia, and up to the present day 
can count its successes only in num- 
bers of victims. 
The approximately 22 million in- 
habitants of former Yugoslavia be- 
longed, according to the census of 
1981, to 24 different nationalities (see 
Table 
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The two primary factors contributing 
to the homogenization of such an 
ethnically diverse population were: 
"brotherhood and unity," a form of 
politically imposed collective identity; 
and "self-management," a specific 
type of socioeconomic homogeniza- 
tion. Other types of collective identity 
such as religion and nationality were 
politically marginalized up until the 
end of the 1980s. Individual rights in 
former Yugoslavia were thus con- 
verged with collective rights, while the 
"nation," that is, its federal units, ac- 
cording to the 1974 Constitution, had 
legal status; a fact which was later 
shown to be a key contributing ele- 
ment of political support for the desta- 
bilization and collapse of Yugoslavia. 
An overall portrait of the Yugoslav 
peoples would also include their un- 
equal cultural, economic, and social 
level of development-and, indeed, 
the territories of the old Yugoslavia 
were full of extreme contradictions on 
all levels. The culturally and economi- 
cally developed "European model" of 
the north contrasted with the southern, 
undeveloped "Byzantium." In be- 
tween lay the geographical, political, 
economic, and cultural middle-the 
"Belgrade region," where, fortunately, 
no ethno-national or nationalistic ho- 
mogenization has managed to make 
Table 1: 
1981 Yugoslavian Census Data 
Nationalities 96 Share 
Montenegrins 2.58 
Croats 19.75 
Macedonians 5.97 
Slovenes 7.20 
Muslims 8.20 
Serbs 36.30 
Albanians 7.20 
Those who declared 
themselves Yugoslavs 5.44 
Others (Hungarians, etc.) - 7.36 
Total 100.00 
any inroads, even today. The "Bel- 
grade region" constitutes the space in 
which, in contrast to other areas of 
"rump" Yugoslavia, the former iden- 
tity of former Yugoslavia--an identity 
of ethnic mix and political pluralism- 
has, on the whole, been preserved. 
The end of the 1980s and the begin- 
ning of the 1990s was a period when 
nation and territory emerged as key 
political components of collective 
identity. The political ideology of 
"brotherhood and unity" was radi- 
cally transformed, and in its place the 
ideology of defence of the national es- 
sence, national interest, and national 
borders, which up until that time had 
been only administrative technical 
questions, took its place. At the social 
level, however, the influence of the 
previous political ideology of brother- 
hood and unity was such that the ques- 
tion of ethno-national belonging, in 
everyday, more or less routine rela- 
tions (among family, neighbours, 
friends, and workplace associates) did 
not have great significance. The years 
1990 and 1991 saw the opening of a 
clearly visible chasm between the new- 
born nationalistic ideology of govern- 
ments and the nature of everyday 
interpersonal relations of members of 
different nationalities. 
In other words, everyday inter- 
personal relations still maintained the 
characteristics of brotherhood and 
unity, just as efforts were being un- 
dertaken to impose a new type of 
collective identity-nation and terri- 
tory-and to establish it as the new 
political ideology, on a large scale and 
with all available means. It was pre- 
cisely that gap between the ethno- 
national political ideology of the 
governing powers and the nature of 
everyday interethnic relations and be- 
haviour of ordinary people, although 
of relatively short duration, which pro- 
vides a clear indication of the origins of 
ethnic conflicts. After that brief inter- 
val, ethno-national political propa- 
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ganda, initiated by some intellectuals 
and by the government in Serbia, and 
in other republics, began to intensify 
and to attract larger and larger num- 
bers of supporters among the popula- 
tion. After the breakdown of the 
federal political leadership of former 
Yugoslavia into republican ethno-na- 
tional leaderships (that is, political 
elites), nationalist tensions heightened 
rapidly and the ethnocultural division 
of the population accelerated dramati- 
cally. The multinational population of 
former Yugoslavia therefore began to 
divide along lines of those who more 
or less accepted predatory nationalist 
'ideologies and those who either ig- 
nored them or resisted them. 
The point at which there was a dis- 
tinguishable differentiation between 
the nationalist ideology of government 
and the quality of interethnic relations 
among the population coincided with 
the most vigorous nationalistic cam- 
paigns in which the media showed 
themselves to be the essential agent of 
communication between government 
and people. Aided by newly emergent, 
vigourous "defenders of the nation," 
nationalist media propaganda at- 
tracted supporters among the popula- 
tion and served to create refugees. The 
first refugees to arrive in Serbia from 
Croatia were recorded in September, 
1990, and from that time their number 
has increased constantly. Refugees 
from the period September, 1990, to 
May, 1991 were on the whole made 
refugees by the dramatic influence of 
media propaganda in service to ethno- 
national political ideology, because the 
primary reasons for their departure 
was media-induced fear. For those 
refugees who departed between May, 
1991, and the end of that year, the main 
reasons stated for leaving their place of 
permanent residence became, besides 
fear, loss of jobs, threats to individuals 
and families, and general endanger- 
ment of life. 
For this reason refugees are living 
witnesses to the process by which the 
media promote ethno-national iden- 
tity as a political ideology, and how, at 
that time, all types of interethnic rela- 
tions in ethnically mixed areas and 
beyond began to be systematically 
crushed. The government and the peo- 
ple, thanks above all to the media, 
gradually established a correspond- 
ence, and the discrepancy between ide- 
ology and interpersonal relations 
began to disappear. This merging of 
views was based, on the one hand, on 
the (rather low-level) political culture 
of the citizen$ and their unprepared- 
ness at the right moment to realize 
what was really happening and what 
the consequences would be; and on the 
other hand, on the narrow interests of 
nationalist political elites to acquire or 
maintain republican power. In addi- 
tion to the low level of political culture, 
the socially urgent need for reconstruc- 
tion of the economy, because of the 
drastic consequences for the standard 
of living set off by the economic and 
political crisis, exacerbated the dissat- 
isfaction of the population and un- 
leashed its irrational energies. It is 
precisely in such a political and social 
atmosphere that the media can suc- 
cessfully intervene between govern- 
ment and people, and the political 
nationalization of discourse through 
media becomes an effective model for 
the reaffirmation of ethno-national 
spirit and the intensification of na- 
tional feelings. The causes of ethno-na- 
tionalistic war in the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia can be found at all 
levels: from international politics and 
internal relations of domestic political 
elites, to the concrete interethnic rela- 
tions of the population. Their relative 
importance can be distinguished se- 
quentially in time. The purpose of 
this work, however, is to shed light on 
the process of the internal political pro- 
duction of ethno-nationalist war. This 
analysis of the "process of mediation" 
between power holders and ethnically 
mixed communities views the indi- 
vidual as having different types of 
roles and engaging in various kinds 
relationships. 
One of the essential questions of this 
work is the reasons for and the timing 
of the onset and acceptance of nation- 
alistic ideologies. The text is based on 
data obtained through research on 
refugees from Croatia in 199lS4 
The Process of Destruction of 
Ethnically Mixed Communities in 
The Former Yugoslavia 
"Brotherhood and unity," which be- 
gan as a political category, created a 
community which then began to break 
down according to the category of 
membership in an ethnic group. The 
radical transformation of one form of 
integration into another, contradictory 
one, over a short period of time, raises 
the question of the operative efficacy 
of individual factors. The dynamic 
with which the ideology of brother- 
hood and unity crossed over into inter- 
ethnic war speaks not so much to the 
theory of a fertile nationalistic latent 
structure as the basis, but rather to the 
efficient joining together of diverse 
political interests, the symbolic order, 
and the specific type of individual iso- 
lated political culture as the principle 
reason for war on the geopolitical ter- 
ritory of Yugoslavia. Further, it speaks 
not to the equilibrium of its signifi- 
cance and power but rather empha- 
sises above all the mobilizing factor 
which insures an indispensable homo- 
geneity and dynamic, and at differing 
intervals. 
The issue of resistance on the part of 
the ethnically mixed community to the 
tendency of destruction, from outside 
or internally, however, leads to the 
question of its constitutive elements 
and the nature of micro-factors of 
integration. 
Within this approach to under- 
standing the reasons for interethnic 
destruction, it must be kept in mind 
that interethnic conflicts, at a concrete 
level, were as a rule initiated by partici- 
pants recruited from groups of sports 
fans, dressed in uniform overnight, 
and paid to become "national defend- 
ers," those who would, in their ethni- 
cally mixed environment, defend their 
"nation" while attacking "the other." 
The sports fan, symbolizing the spirit 
of collectivity, provides the particular 
type of energy capable of expressing 
and acting on aggression. This was not 
entirely coincidental, for traditionally 
fan euphoria at sports matches be- 
tween teams from different republics 
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often had a nationalistic tone in former 
Yugoslavia. 
The transformation of the indi- 
vidual from a non-ethnic self-manager 
into a vigorous ethno-nationalist be- 
gan, under pressure of the media's 
manipulation of information, with the 
closing of media borders between re- 
publics. Nationalistic propaganda in 
ethnically mixed regions in Croatia 
brought out "self-invited" protectors 
of the nation, nationalist volunteers 
from all regions of Serbia and Croatia, 
to defend local residents from each 
other: a Serbian housewife from a 
Croatian housewife, a Serbian neigh- 
bour from a Croatian neighbour, a Ser- 
bian brother from a Croatian brother. 
The institutionalization of nationalism 
began with the firing of Serbs from 
workplaces in areas where Croats con- 
stituted the majority of the population, 
and conversely the firing of Croats 
from workplaces in areas where Serbs 
were in the majority, or where they 
held positions of political responsibil- 
ity. The standard socialist distribution 
of power and decision-making, in ac- 
cordance with principles of the politi- 
cal rotation of cadres,= was in this 
respect operative, so that it was not 
even necessary to take a formal institu- 
tional decision. Such decisions were, 
only later, retroactively entered into 
the books. Municipal politicians, locals 
of political standing, were coerced 
(whether or not they wanted to) into 
adhering to the ethno-national divi- 
sion of the town or village in which 
they lived--and this became a life or 
death question. If the members of the 
other ethnic group did not kill him, the 
members of his own would kill him as 
a traitor. With the destruction of ethni- 
cally mixed areas in this way complete, 
the only remaining question was the 
ethnic cleansing of the place. 
Although within former Yugoslavia 
there existed several types of cultural 
models which were very different 
from one another, the relatively com- 
mon characteristic of all ethnic groups 
was the decisive basis for the transfor- 
mation to nationalism. A systemati- 
cally developed authoritarian social 
character along with a discernible 
mentality, latent nationalistic tension, 
and worsening conditions of existence 
guaranteed the success of a manipula- 
tion toward the option of war. War was 
the consequence of the destructive in- 
fluence of nationalistic ideology and 
depended not only on the effectiveness 
of the manipulating agent, but also on 
the latent structure of society, the mi- 
cro-community. 
The extent to which the ethnic com- 
munity was homogeneous and the na- 
ture of influence of specific factors on 
the destruction of that community can 
best be seen from the results of empiri- 
cal research carried out with refugees 
who left their homes prior to the sum- 
mer of 1991, directly before the out- 
break of the worst armed  conflict^.^ 
The theoretical question with which 
we were unavoidably confronted in 
this analysis was: can the condition of 
being or becoming a refugee be consid- 
ered a form of migration, if the primary 
motive for departure stems from an 
undefined fear (as expressed by the 
first refugees of 1990), or from direct 
threat to life (as experienced by those 
who came later, in the summer of 
1991)? Migrants by definition always 
have a larger possibility of rational 
choices and voluntary decisions, while 
for refugees such choices are severely 
limited. It is a particular type of coer- 
cion that forces one to become a refu- 
gee, which differs from the reasons for 
voluntary migration, in terms of the 
intensity of endangerment to one's ex- 
istence. Thus the refugee must be con- 
sidered distinct from the migrant, and 
therefore the theoretical concepts con- 
cerning migrants are inadequate for 
the analysis of refugees. The only simi- 
larity between refugees and voluntary 
migrants lies in the fact that members 
of both groups become "second class 
citizens" in the milieu in which they 
settle, and their status becomes and 
remains a part of their social "identity 
card" for succeeding generations. The 
absurdity of this case is that these indi- 
viduals are refugees within the former 
Yugoslavia, irrespective of ethno-na- 
tional identity, and are thus refugees 
within their former homeland. Moving 
to their "native" ethnic republic does 
not, however, lead to ethno-national 
homogenization, but rather to an in- 
crease in intra-ethnic tensions, and 
even to conflicts. The assimilation of 
Serbian refugees from Croatia among 
"old Serbian residents of Serbia" is hin- 
dered by the differences between the 
two groups, which are manifested at 
several levels: from everyday habits 
(in workplaces and elsewhere) to lan- 
guage. This confirms the notion that 
the social impulses for conformity 
within everyday life, no matter what 
the cultural milieu, are sufficiently 
strong that national identity becomes 
overshadowed. Therefore, ethno-na- 
tional predatory behaviour can be- 
come a basic part of everyday 
interpersonal relations only through 
politically manipulated transforma- 
tion. 
How Did They Live Together 
Before? 
The historical memories of the popula- 
tion concerning brutalinterethnic (and 
inter-religious) conflicts during the 
course of world war has often been 
referred to by some Serbian intellectu- 
als as the key proof for the theoretical 
interpretation of reasons for the flight 
of refugees today. However, the data 
from our research indicate that con- 
temporary ethnic conflicts did not start 
spontaneously, as a result of integra- 
tion of personal and group experience 
in interethnic threat over the course of 
time from the Second World War to the 
present day, nor did the historical 
memory of "Ustasa genocide against 
the Serbian people in the Second 
World War" provoke a new wave of 
killing. But it is certain that "collective 
memory" of this act was the articulated 
target of the media for the purpose of 
strengthening Serbs' ethno-national 
feelings. It is also certain that its articu- 
lation as a basic element for nationaliz- 
ing discourse arose from a certain 
latent structure through to everyday 
interpersonal relations, as will be 
shown later. 
A total of 60.3 percent of the inform- 
ants in this study indicated that in 
interethnic relations in the postwar 
period (i.e, after the Second World 
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War) there was never any sort of divi- 
sion; 60.2 percent indicated that there 
was never any interethnic intolerance; 
77.7 percent said there were never eth- 
nic conflicts at the personal level, and 
83.9 percent said there were never any 
ethnic conflicts at the group level. At 
the same time, 39.7 percent of the in- 
formants indicated that there were 
interethnic divisions in the postwar 
period; 39.8 percent that there was 
interethnic intolerance; 22.3 percent 
that there were personal interethnic 
conflicts, while 16.1 percent said that 
there had been interethnic group con- 
flicts. Careful analysis of these data, 
however, suggests that thelatent struc- 
tures for the development of ethnic 
conflicts in ethnically mixed areas 
were already present, but not to such a 
degree that one could expect their 
spontaneous transformation into na- 
tionalistic conflict or war. Informants 
in this study typically characterized 
the breakdowns in interethnic rela- 
tions in the period after the Second 
World War in the following terms: 
. . . when the opportunity arose, 
Croats would withdraw to their side, 
Serbs to theirs ... after the events at 
Kosovo, Croats considered that Al- 
banians should be given their repub- 
lic, while Serbs believed the 
opposite, and there would be argu- 
ments, especially at work. It rarely 
came to fisticuffs, and it would al- 
ways be outside, after working 
hours, so nobody knows how often 
this happened . . . [a pensioner from 
Vukovar]. 
. . . intolerance was always initiated 
from the top: usually there was some 
political event which the govern- 
ment was responsible for, and be- 
cause of which people would 
quarrel, and divide according to eth- 
nic identity . . . [an economist from 
Zadar]. 
These expressions of these refugees 
reflect the political nationalization of 
discourse organized by the media 
which began the process of political 
and nationalist transformation of the 
self-consciousness of the "self-manag- 
ing" individual. Here it should be 
mentioned that the "self-manager" 
was only declaratively a political sub- 
ject of the melting-pot; while national- 
ist ideologies have as their political 
subject the authentic nationalist. Nev- 
ertheless, the "self-manager of broth- 
erhood and unity" finally realized, 
after 40 years of manipulation, that all 
decisions were in any case made out- 
side the workers' councils. This was 
one of the factors that gave birth to 
resistance to the socialist regime, and 
was yet another source of dissatisfac- 
tion and mobilization of irrational en- 
ergy. The concept of "worker" evolved 
through "working people" to arrive at 
"nationalist" and "nationalistic inter- 
est." One form of manipulation was 
replaced by another. The filtered po- 
litical category of "self-manager" 
encouraged the individual to learn 
conformity to the crowd, to govern- 
ment, and to prevailing policy, and left 
the individual without a suitable social 
role, without a wider social framework 
for collective identity. At the same 
time, as a model of "political literacy," 
the concept of the "self-manager" was 
based on the principles that authority 
belonged to its adherents, power ac- 
crued to its supporters and to the 
obedient, the political subject concep- 
tualized according to political object, 
and sources of information according 
to the needs of the (un)informed. The 
possibility (and the incentives) for the 
self-manager to become a citizen were 
successfully cancelled out through 
political intervention. 
From the data it can also be seen that 
the character of interethnic relations 
after the Second World War up until 
the present reflected a significantly 
greater measure of orientation toward 
"brotherhood andunity," but that they 
also became, in a relatively hidden 
way, oriented to ethnic tension. The 
first level of interpretation of this 
contradictory fact is that "Yugo- 
slavism" and nationalism both had the 
foundation, and therefore the poten- 
tial, to be developed further. The sec- 
ond level of interpretation focuses on 
the differences in the foundations of 
Yugoslavism, on the one hand, and of 
ethnic tensions, on the other. The con- 
cept of Yugoslavism, at first only 
through ideological propaganda and 
political directives, penetrated all in- 
terpersonal relations, and became a 
way of life, a peculiarly Yugoslav real- 
ity. The population of former Yugosla- 
via, according to the data, was to a very 
large extent unburdened with the 
question of ethnic affiliation. 
Without disputing the possibility of 
the persistence of "historical memory" 
as a latent structure, we have to em- 
phasize nevertheless that in such so- 
cial and political circumstances it did 
not appear to play a role in the sponta- 
neous (internal) provocation of con- 
flict because, for one thing, the number 
of those who had been witnesses to 
those events was steadily diminishing 
(some 40 years had elapsed), and for 
another, the remaining sources 
through which this "memory" could 
continue and be sustained were nei- 
ther current nor widespread. More- 
over, ethno-national conflicts within 
ethnically mixed communities did not 
erupt in all ethnically mixed areas at 
the same time. These circumstances 
notwithstanding, "historical memory" 
has been brought directly into political 
propaganda, and, once conflicts esca- 
lated, used as a supplementary motive 
for ethnic hatred and ethnic defence. 
Interpersonal Relations Prior to 
Exile 
We attempted to trace the mechanisms 
of interethnic destruction through the 
informants' testimony concerning the 
quality of relationships in everyday 
life with family, friends, neighbours, 
and workplace associates. It began, our 
respondents noted, "with the distanc- 
ing, the cooling of relations," and "it 
ended up with the shelling or mining 
of houses, with being forced out." 
.Our research also confirmed at this 
level that the functioning of the Yugo- 
slav "melting pot" (interethnic inte- 
gration under the influence of the 
ideology of brotherhood and unity) 
was exceptionally successful: more 
than four-fifths (86.0 percent) of the in- 
formants testified to good relations 
with neighbours and with members of 
other ethnic groups, as many as 95.1 
percent had well developed friend- 
ships, and more than two-thirds (66.5 
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percent) had relations with relatives 
who were members of other ethnic 
groups-primarily on the basis of eth- 
nically mixed marriages. These find- 
ings challenge to a significant degree 
the theory about historical continuity 
of ethnic conflicts and speak to the the- 
sis that current ethnic conflicts did not 
begin spontaneously, as a continuity 
of genocidal hatred, but rather were 
somehow artificially provoked or in- 
duced. The culmination of interethnic 
disintegration in violent armed con- 
flicts had a decisive influence on the 
worsening of relations between mem- 
bers of different nationalities. Thus, 
58.8 percent of informants testified 
that relations with neighbours had 
deteriorated, while a similar number 
found that friendships with members 
of different nationalities had been 
damaged (58.5 percent); family rela- 
tionships, on the other hand, which 
tend to be strongest, were most suc- 
cessfully sustained-although every 
fifth informant (21.1 pekent) con- 
firmed that even family relationships 
had suffered. 
Ethnic Conflicts-the Beginning 
and the Escalation 
Current interethnic conflicts began to 
intensify during the pre-election cam- 
paign at the time of the first postwar 
multi-party elections in Croatia, in 
April, 1990. That campaign was identi- 
fied by 14.9 percent of the informants 
as a contributing factor to conflict. The 
aggressive campaign of the victorious 
party, the Croatian Democratic Union, 
and particularly the framework of that 
party's electoral programme-crea- 
tion of an ethno-national state with a 
diminishing of political rights for mi- 
norities-resulted in the establishment 
of a political authority which evoked 
suspicion among members of other 
ethnic groups. About one-third of the 
informants in this study (35.5 percent) 
mentioned this as a reason for the 
worsening of interethnic relations, and 
the potential realization of the party's 
programme, which called forth the ac- 
tive resistance of the Serbian popula- 
tion (the events of the so-called "log 
revolution" in the Knin region), is the 
next reason given by 8.2 percent of the 
informants. Conflicts burst into flame 
during the first quarter of 1991 (accord- 
ing to 7.7 percent of the respondents), 
and intensified in the second quarter 
(17.1 percent) when open armed con- 
flict began. 
The first refugees did not emerge as 
a result of the continuation of ethnic 
conflicts, but rather as a product of 
media-induced fear. In the first wave, 
that is, up until May 1,1991, according 
to the data obtained in this study, the 
main reason for departure was the 
media coverage of Martin Spegelj, a 
former General of the Yugoslav Peo- 
ple's Army and a current General of 
the Croatian Army-as he negotiated 
the purchase of weapons with which, 
to paraphrase his remarks, "every- 
thing that is Serbian will be killed." 
The sharpening of interethnic con- 
flicts in the months in which the 
number of refugees rose dramatically 
was manifested in different ways. A 
direct motive for departure was, there- 
fore, an escalation from simply "fear" 
itself to "fear of war," "fear of re- 
venge," "fear for one's life." In condi- 
tions of interethnic conflicts, fear, as an 
irrationalcategory, is structured at two 
essential rational levels: the historical 
and the current political. At the same 
time, (the individual's) fear, at the lo- 
cal level of ethnic conflicts, is subjected 
to the influence of all kinds of anomic 
effects. These include: changes in the 
system of government, police and law; 
changes in leading personnel in the 
economic and social sectors; limitation 
of negative freedoms (movement and 
work, social security, etc.); symbolic 
and cultural self-identification (flags, 
crests, language, media); as well as dif- 
ferent forms of deviant behaviour 
(from abuse of the vulnerable to rob- 
bery, theft, and violence). 
The question that many citizens of 
the former Yugoslavia ask themselves 
is: who is to blame for the situation in 
which we now find ourselves? We felt 
it was necessary to pose this question 
about the "guilty" party to our refugee 
informants, but within the framework 
of two assumptions. First, anyone who 
lived through the current situation and 
through concrete personal (family) 
tragedy, such as exile, would have his 
or her representation of who is respon- 
sible for it. Second, we wanted to find 
out if and to what extent refugees 
merged radicalization with generali- 
zation, and whether they would con- 
sider the guilty party the Croatian 
people in general. The distribution of 
answers indicated that only one of 
every twenty informants blames the 
Croatian people. The majority of re- 
spondents (63.1 percent) blamed the 
current Croatian government, and its 
President, Tudjman. It is noteworthy 
that every fifth informant also blamed 
the Serbianleadership. The data for the 
two most commonly mentioned guilty 
parties (the "Croatian government" 
and "all political leaderships") dit- 
fered according to the ethnic identity 
of the informant. 
Results of research on refugees from 
Croatia in 1991 indicate that commu- 
nal life with different ethnic groups in 
the same territory over many decades 
had those characteristics which, ac- 
cording to the manner of expression of 
ethnic identity, would be unlikely to 
be reversed. Rather, the characteristics 
of the established ethnically mixed 
community revealed more about the 
lack of civil rights and freedoms, the 
existence of social differences, the ten- 
dency to unlawful or wilful decisions 
by local authorities, that is, all other 
things except nationalistic tensions. 
Horizontal nationalistic energy was 
released by the interest of political 
elites, and distributed from top to bot- 
tom along the social vertical of the 
community. 
The combination of underdevel- 
oped political culture, burdensome 
social conditions caused by economic 
crisis, and the unleashing of irrational 
energy as a result of the precipitous fall 
in the standard of living, provided suf- 
ficient ground for intermediary agents 
to mobilize the latent structure, that is, 
to establish a vital "collaboration" be- 
tween government and people. At the 
same time, the then relatively homog- 
enous ethnically mixed community 
began at that point to be visited by 
ethno-national "volunteer" groups 
- -  - 
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(who were to become the nationalist 
paramilitary groups later on) from Ser- 
bia and Croatia. Their intention was to 
"defend local Serb residents from lo- 
cal Croat residents, and vice versa. 
These "newcomers" proclaimed them- 
otectors of the (Serbian or 
s the case maybe) nation and 
of the ndhonalinterest, while local resi- 
dents, at least at the beginning, 
"asked" them not to come any more to 
"defend" them, because they did not 
need defending. But these Serb and 
Croat paramilitary "newcomers" 
started to threaten the local residents, 
to push people into supporting them. 
In addition to these paramilitary 
"newcomer" groups, "military" terri- 
torial defence groups were also 
formed, somewhat later (and these lat- 
ter were joined by the local population 
regardless of their ethnic identity). 
During this time the Yugoslav People's 
Army was being gradually deserted by 
members of all nationalities except 
Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims 
(Muslims began to leave the Army 
only after the situation in Bosnia wors- 
ened in 1992). The resulting Yugoslav 
People's Army, now almost ethnically 
"pure" in composition, was later 
obliged to "keep the peace" in ethni- 
cally mixed areas. Thus began the 
armed destruction. 
National Identity: Secular Religion 
or Political Category 
National identity is a category which 
contains simultaneously within itself 
historical, individual-psychological, 
cultural, social, and political dimen- 
sions, and among which the domi- 
nance of one over the other depends on 
the degree of current sociopolitical 
pressure exerted upon it. It therefore 
can be manifested in different ways: as 
an individual feeling, as a cultural 
model, as social relationship, or as a 
collective and political category. Only 
in so far as the basic conceptual-subjec- 
tive feeling in consciousness of ethnic 
belonging can be expressed, as a part 
of the individual citizen's legitimate 
private-legal dignity, then this ines- 
capable characteristic of the individual 
does not have metahistorical, metacul- 
tural, or metasocial connotation. In 
every other case national identity is the 
instrumentalization of a privately held 
self-concept, and is a manipulation of 
those human characteristics, which in 
any case the individual has no choice. 
Individual identity is constructed 
upon diverse social roles carried out 
more or less routinely in everyday life. 
Not one of these routine, everyday so- 
cial roles, whether in the interpersonal 
sphere, working relations, or leisure 
time, depends upon, nor is it a function 
of, the person's ethno-national iden- 
tity, and the nature of the individual's 
routine, everyday obligations does not 
in any respect refer to national iden- 
tity. Only when ethno-national iden- 
tity, "as a secular religion of the 
individual," is transformed into a po- 
liticalideology does it become a critical 
precondition for the carrying out of 
any social role. Ethno-national identity 
then becomes the primary social role 
upon which everything else depends, 
and the basis of (lack of) privilege of 
the personality irrespective of his or 
her level of education, professional 
orientation, or some other special char- 
acteristic or quality. 
Model of Nationalization of Dis- 
course in the Former Yugoslavia 
The construction of nationalist (politi- 
cal and everyday) culture within the 
behaviour of former citizens of Yugo- 
slavia did not begin simultaneously on 
all levels of society. Nationalism as a 
political strategy significantly pre- 
ceded the lower-level cheapest street 
production of nationalist images and 
sentiments. Nevertheless, some intel- 
lectuals who manufactured "Cole Por- 
ter nationalism" were, in the span of 
five years, able to establish successful 
foundations for communication-and 
everything that the first ones thought 
up, these others justified. 
The manner in which a political idea 
(nationalism in former Yugoslavia) 
begins to come alive semantically, and 
thus to have an impact upon indi- 
vidual consciousness, unfolds in a po- 
litically anticipated direction. Thus, 
one of the questions to be asked is the 
"hierarchy of factors of influence" on 
the conditions of realization of norma- 
tive acts. In cases such as Yugoslavia, 
"the form of political community" is 
(and was) dictated by the "activity of 
state power," and not "the political 
will of the community itself." From 
this state of affairs, "the national idea 
semantically began to function above 
all as a destabilizer of the 'ethnic state,' 
that is, in the form of 'regional rebel- 
lion,' 'awakening of small nations,' 
and 'self-consciousness of ethnic mi- 
norities.'"7The breakup of Yugoslavia 
into 'parts and unities of societies' was 
such that the legitimizing bases of 
power became weaker and weaker. At 
precisely this interval, the totalitarian 
government introduces new ruling 
technologies, first through new politi- 
cal discourse, and then through 
mechanisms of "controlled liberaliza- 
tion." Changes within political dis- 
course provoke changes within the 
symbolic order and within public 
opinion, which begins to be pluralized: 
from acceptance and support of the 
new rhetorical project, and then fur- 
ther on to its practice, to its criticism, 
and to its rejection. In other words, the 
new ethno-political discourse manu- 
factures both supporters and oppo- 
nents. Supporters transform it into 
concrete action, while opponents re- 
main on the margins, because their 
actions cannot compare with those of 
holders of official power and the sup- 
porters among "the wider popular 
masses." The collapse of "old" social 
connections and the establishment of 
new ones takes place, above all, under 
the influence of various communica- 
tions processes. 
The expressly articulated presence 
of nation, national interest, and na- 
tional essence, and the overall nation- 
alization of discourse in everyday 
speech and interpersonal relation- 
ships, began with more intensive po- 
litical discussions of the meaning of 
national identity and the safeguarding 
of the national interest. The introduc- 
tion of nation and national interest in 
everyday political rhetoric in Yugosla- 
via took place at the moment when an 
exclusively counterproductive eco- 
nomic policy and economic crisis 
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threatened the state, and not some 
other nation. The republican leader- 
ships resolved the federal govern- 
ment's crisis of legitimacy by evoking 
ethno-national spirit and national in- 
terest for their respective republics. 
Ethno-national interest was at first 
politically cloaked in ideological dis- 
cussions and declarations, and then 
evolved into political action. The most 
decisively important political action 
that facilitated the introduction of na- 
tionalism was the closing off of the 
media within the republican sphere. 
With the internal republican isolation 
of the media came subsequent debates 
about which alphabet (Cyrillic or 
the level of the republic, an illusory 
social equilibrium. The consequences 
of the economic crisis, which affected 
all of Yugoslavia, began to be "re- 
solved" at the level of the nation, and 
the blame for that crisis was laid on the 
other nation. 
Ethno-national interest becomes 
identified with the territory (in this 
case the region of Croatia) on which 
people had, over a period of many 
years, established a system of mixed 
social networks, which, irrespective of 
national identity, functioned to the 
advantage of everyone. The pol- 
iticization of one's ownethno-national 
interest through its "protection" by 
. The symbolic order in totalitarian regimes always creates a fictive 
public. Real events, impregnated with ideological-political symbols, 
are degenerated and incorporated into a system of information1 
knowledge structured on a reliably predictable public opinion. 
Latin) was to be used in the subtitles of 
films and for the most widely viewed 
programmes. After the "closing off" of 
the media, which was initiated follow- 
ing the former Yugoslav state holiday 
of November 29,1989, a common Yu- 
goslav media, for all practical pur- 
poses, ceased to exist. Viewers were no 
longer able to watch regularly alternat- 
ing daily informative news reports 
from the other republican centres, 
which had been standard practice in 
the past; and now had the opportunity 
only to watch the daily news pro- 
grammes prepared within their own 
republics. 
The national interest, under this 
kind of political "protection," consti- 
tutes the misuse of historical roots and 
the vulgar manipulation of ethno-na- 
tional feelings of the individual to the 
profit of political interests by those 
who measure national interest only in 
terms of protecting their own current 
political self-interests. Ethno-national 
interest projected in this way involves 
the politicization of the individual's 
origins, emotions, and personal fates, 
and enhances the construction of ag- 
gression. The raising of ethno-national 
interest to the level of policy was a 
political strategy for establishing, at 
means of brutal ethnic conflicts, which 
were allegedly only an act and product 
of defence, is an absurdindicator of the 
collective hysteria resulting from inad- 
equate political integration of mem- 
bership in the community, a 
community burdened with increased 
social misery brought on by a worn- 
out andinappropriate political system, 
and not by some other nation. The ab- 
surdity is compounded as the politici- 
zation of ethno-national interest 
intensifies the misery, and predatory 
nationalism and ethno-national hatred 
grows deeper, directed not only to- 
ward the "enemy" nation but also to 
one's own nation. The process of 
ethno-national transition accompanies 
the disappearance of the legal state, as 
more massive use is made of all the 
resources and behaviours that in con- 
ditions of social equilibrium bear the 
mark of the criminal-disorganiza- 
tion, lawlessness, and crime. 
The nationalization of discourse, 
which unfolded from the beginning of 
December, 1989, also produced mili- 
tant nationalists, who supported the 
war as national defence and liberation. 
The model of homogenization by 
means of nationalistic discourse went 
out in the form "us" and "them." 
Enemies are "them," that is, all other 
nations. 
The symbolic order in totalitarian 
regimes always creates a fictive public. 
Real events, impregnated with ideo- 
logical-political symbols, are degener- 
ated and incorporated into a system of 
information1 knowledge structured 
on a reliably predictable public opin- 
ion. Media commentaries, for exam- 
ple, as an essential part of this 
information system, have the task of 
"informing" according to the govern- 
ment's political requirements of the 
day. In this way a fictitious picture of 
reality was created, and a so-called 
"people's will" manufactured and set 
in motion with forcefully directed en- 
ergy. This creation constituted "proof" 
of the legitimacy of "democratic" gov- 
ernment. Such a fictive public eventu- 
ally takes on a life of its own as an 
independent "authentic collective 
spirit." 
From the moment that the empty 
legitimate space of power was "filled 
after the fall of communism, it began to 
be filled by the nation," that is, the na- 
tionalization of political discourse 
evolved, to the point at which a new 
reality was produced: "ethno-national 
reality: division and ethnic conflicts," 
on the basis of which further, and in 
more dramatic form, disintegrative 
processes unfolded for which the gov- 
ernment's solution was held to be in 
narrowing of options to ethno-national 
interests. In the model of the authori- 
tarian regime, as was the case in former 
Yugoslavia, nationalization of political 
discourse achieved a "special paradox: 
that in the name of which and because 
of which this began became a lever of 
its own destruction. That lever was 
freedom understood as the nation. The 
equalization of nations through free- 
dom alone clears the path for its eleva- 
tion to an idolized ideal, which 
becomes characteristic of a new au- 
thoritarian ~ r d e r . " ~  In the "old" social- 
ist demagogy, people were subjected 
to political socialization oriented to 
defence against the class enemy; in the 
"new" nationalistic demagogy people 
are oriented toward defence against 
the enemy nation-against those who, 
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only yesterday, were their closest 
relatives, friends, neighbours, or 
colleagues. 
Political pluralism, within the terri- 
tories of the former Yugoslavia, unfor- 
tunately coincided with the rise of 
ethno-nationalism, and the crucial po- 
litical question concerned national 
borders. The matter of secession of the 
republics from Yugoslavia, with main- 
tenance of what had until then been 
"administrative borders," resulted in 
growing conflict among diverse politi- 
cal interests of republican leaderships 
within .the federal government. The 
stratem according to which residents 
of Craatia had to decide whether or not 
they wanted an independent Croatia, 
was ethno-nationally based: Serbs 
who live in Croatia did not want it- 
this was decided for them by 
Milosevic, and Croats wanted it-this 
was decided for them by Tudjrnan. 
Whether all Croats were really in fa- 
vour of an independence state and its 
emancipation from the "Yugoslav 
prison," and whether all Serbs really 
wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, was a 
meaningful question for the republi- 
can political establishments. Both the 
one and the other republican govern- 
ment "knew" in advance what their 
nations would support. 
Notes 
1. This work is a short extract from a broader 
study which includes data from research 
with refugees from Croatia in 1991 as well 
as refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1992. 
2. Figures are taken from Dusan Breznik, 
"s~anovnistvo Jugoslavije," ~onzorcijum 
Instituta drustvenih nauka (Titograd: 
. - 
Chronos, 1991). 
3. Podunavac,Milan. Pditickakulturn i politicki 
odnosi (Belgrade: Radnicka stampa, 1982). 
4. The project "Displaced Persons from 
Croatia, 1991," was carried outby the Argu- 
ment Agency for Applied Political and So- 
ciological Research (founded in 1990). 
Fieldwork was conducted in September 
1991, at which time on the territory of the 
Republic of Serbia there were about 88,000 
displaced persons from Croatia. The sam- 
ple covers 650 informants, i.e., representa- 
tives of displaced households. According to 
the data of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross for the period September- 
December 1991, the number of displaced 
persons from Croatia amounted to 588,000. 
Out of this number 318,000 (54 percent) re- 
settled from the crisis areas into provincial 
areas of Croatia, and 270,000 into other Yu- 
goslav Republics. On the basis of these data, 
as well as according to the incomplete re- 
sults of the Yumslav census of 1991, these 
compulsory mibations out of Croatia con- 
stitute 12.4percent of the total population of 
this ~ e ~ u i l i c ,  of which 9.0 brcent is 
Croatian population and 44.3 percent Ser- 
bian. However, when examining the share 
of displaced population compared with the 
total number of inhabitants of the Republic 
of Croatia, then the Serbian displacedpopu- 
lation totals 5.7 percent and Croatian 6.9 
percent of that number. According to statis- 
tics of the High Commission of the United 
Nations, at the end of April 1992, the number 
of refugees W ~ S  i n ~ a $ h g  daily ~d has d- 
ready passed the one-million mark. 
Those who were loyal to the old political 
system now became loyal to the ethno-na- 
tionalistic order, sensing that they were 
called to the function of being the alert 
guardians, formerly of "self-management," 
now of ethno-national interests, because 
that legitimized the function that they ac- 
quired in return for their moral-political 
capability. 
The researchincluded refugees from 52 eth- 
nically mixed municipalities in the Repub- 
lic of Croatia, involving 153 settlements of 
urban and rural type. In more than 
two-thirds of the municipalities (68.4 per- 
cent), refugees were recruited from the 
population which represented the ethnic 
minority in these munidpalities; inone-fifth 
(21.1 percent) the potential refugee popula- 
tion was the majority in the municipality, 
while in 10.5 percent there was a relative 
ethnic balance. More than two-fifths (44.9 
percent) of the members of refugee house- 
holds, for which representatives were inter- 
viewed, represent an indigenous 
population (that is, they resided in their 
place of birth); more than one-third (34.6 
percent) were intra-republican migrants; 
while one-fifth had come from outside the 
Republic of Croatia to settle there. 
From the total number of all members of 
households in our sample in exile, 46.6 per- 
cent were male and 52.9 percent were fe- 
male, and in terms of age Ghort, the largest 
number were between the ages of 31 and 40 
years. With respect to nationality, 87.9 per- 
cent wereserbs, with the remainingbelong- 
ing to other ethnic groups-which is not 
necessarily an indication of mixed mar- 
riages, since the number of married and 
unmarried was almost the same: 43.1 per- 
cent and 41.5 percent respectively. 
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